Software Won't Fix a Bad Safety Culture - Part 2

In my previous article last week, I described what I view to be the systemic issues that played into Boeing's deployment of a flawed 737 Max.  As you may recall, my article began as an extended commentary on an article published by EE Times -- "Software Won't Fix a 'Faulty' Airframe".  This article continues on that path, with some talk about the "cultural laziness" described in that article, along with other elements of safety-culture within regulated industries, such as aerospace.  [the orginal version of this article was published on LinkedIn]

Software Won't Fix a Bad Safety Culture

I read an EE Times article entitled "Software Won’t Fix Boeing’s 'Faulty' Airframe", which discusses the recent situation with the Boeing 737 Max. The article made several very good points that I thought warranted comment, but I found that I had more to say than would fit in a standard post.  I think the lessons are valid for a broader audience than the aviation industry, so for those who don't have an aviation background, I will try to avoid and/or clarify the jargon. I am working with information limited to public reports and articles from those in the know, so it is possible that my information or interpretations are incorrect; and outside of that -- this is all just my opinion. That's my disclaimer... Moving on. [the original version of this article was published on LinkedIn]